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COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Fuentes'
(decided April 7, 2009)
Jose Fuentes was convicted of first degree rape and first de-
gree sodomy.2 The defense counsel moved to set aside the verdict
arguing that a Brady violation occurred because the prosecutor sup-
pressed a record of consultation of the victim. Pursuant to New
York's Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") section 33.30[l],[3], the de-
fense counsel argued that a Brady violation required a reversal of the
defendant's conviction and the granting of a new trial because the de-
fendant's Due Process rights under the United States Constitution 3
and New York State Constitution4 were violated.' The trial court de-
nied the motion holding that "the outcome of the trial [would not
have changed] as the [record of consultation] did not materially bear
on [the] defendant's guilt or innocence." 6
Furthermore, the trial court found that the defendant received
the consultation note during the trial; therefore, the defendant could
have utilized it as he saw fit. 7 Fuentes appealed to the Appellate Di-
vision, Second Department, which affirmed the trial court's decision
and held that the defendant was "given a meaningful opportunity to
use the allegedly exculpatory material to cross-examine the People's
witnesses or as evidence during his case."8 Fuentes then requested
leave to appeal from the New York Court of Appeals, which granted
his request on the issue of whether the defendant suffered a Brady vi-
People v. Fuentes (Fuentes I), 907 N.E.2d 286 (N.Y. 2009).
2 Id. at 289.
U.S. CONST. amend. V, states, in pertinent part: "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
4 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6, states, in pertinent part: "[n]o person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law."
5 Fuentes 1, 907 N.E.2d at 289.
6 Id.
SId.
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olation when a record of consultation prepared by the hospital psy-
chiatrist was not disclosed. 9
The incident occurred on January 27, 2002, and there were
two accounts as to what occurred in the hours leading to the crime in
question.o The victim claims that the evening prior, she took a train
home to Brooklyn with her friend and her friend's mother after visit-
ing an arcade near Times Square." While walking home, Fuentes
followed the victim into her building and into the building's eleva-
tor.12 Once the two were alone in the elevator, Fuentes placed a knife
to the victim's neck and threatened to cut her if she did not coope-
rate.' 3 Fuentes then led the victim to the roof where he raped and so-
domized her.14 Shortly thereafter, Fuentes forced the victim to walk
with him to the subway where he talked with her, shut off her cell
phone, wiped the exterior clean, and told her not to call anyone or re-
port the incident to the police." For several hours the victim did not
tell anyone out of fear, but eventually she went to a friend's home,
disclosed what occurred, and sought medical attention.' 6 At the hos-
pital, a rape kit was administered and psychiatric evaluation was con-
ducted on the victim.' 7 The police also interviewed the victim."
Fuentes recounts a different version of the events on the even-
ing in question. According to Fuentes, he and two other friends met
the victim at an arcade in Times Square that evening.19 As the night
was winding down, the two proceeded to the subway where they both
took a train to Brooklyn where the victim lived. 20 Shortly thereafter,
the victim led Fuentes to the roof of her apartment where the victim
proceeded to be "sexually aggressive," and eventually "had consen-
sual sexual intercourse." 21 Fuentes maintains that the victim volunta-
9 Id. at 287, 289.




" Fuentes 1, 907 N.E.2d at 287.
16 Id. at 287-88.
17 Id. at 288.
I8 Id.
19 Id
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rily walked with him to the subway after having "consensual sexual
intercourse," but became extremely upset when he said that he did
not want to see her anymore.22 The victim told Fuentes that he would
regret not wanting to see her anymore.23
Prior to trial, the victim's medical records were disclosed to
defense counsel as the prosecution has an "open file discovery
agreement;" 24 however, this did not contain the record of consultation
drafted by the hospital's psychiatrist.25 At trial, a private investigator
testified that the victim previously corroborated Fuentes' version of
the events, but the investigator never made a record of the interview
with the victim. 26 However, in 2004, two years later, the medical ex-
aminer issued a report concluding that the sample taken from the rape
kit matched Fuentes' DNA.27
During trial, these records were admitted into evidence.28
However, the one-page record of consultation drafted by the hospit-
al's psychiatrist, which was not previously disclosed, was also admit-
ted into evidence along with the disclosed documents. 29 Since the de-
fense counsel had no knowledge of this report until summation, the
defense counsel did not cross-examine any of the prosecution's wit-
nesses regarding the psychiatrist's report. 30 However, upon discovery
of the document at summation, the defense counsel demanded a mi-
strial.3 ' The prosecution claims that it did not disclose the document
because they thought that it was privileged.32 The court did not grant
the mistrial, but removed the undisclosed consultation note from the
record so that the prosecution could not utilize it on closing, and
therefore the jury would never see or hear of the document.33









30 Fuentes I, 907 N.E.2d at 288.
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United States Constitution 34 guarantees "a criminal defendant the
right to discover favorable evidence in the People's possession ma-
terial to guilt or punishment." 3 5  The touchstone of the Due Process
Clause is fairness, and it gives criminal defendants the right to obtain
exculpatory evidence.36 There are three elements to establish a Brady
violation:37 "(1) the evidence is favorable to the defendant because it
is either exculpatory or impeaching in nature; (2) the evidence was
suppressed by the prosecution; and (3) prejudice arose because the
suppressed evidence was material."38
The first element will be satisfied depending upon the facts of
the case. What is exculpatory or impeaching is likely to be a case-by-
case determination. 39  The second element is satisfied even if the
suppression is not willful or inadvertent because it is not the intent of
the prosecution that determines a Brady violation, rather the character
of the evidence. 40 The third element is analyzed under a "reasonable
probability" standard, which holds that "undisclosed evidence is ma-
terial only if there is a 'reasonable probability' that it 'would' have
altered the outcome of the trial; a reasonable probability is 'a proba-
bility sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' ,41
Additionally, a Brady violation prevents a fair trial under the
Sixth Amendment since the criminal defendant is entitled to any ex-
34 U.S. CONST. amend. V, states, in pertinent part: "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
" Fuentes I, 907 N.E.2d at 289.
36 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963).
[I]f a state has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial
which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty
... [s]uch a contrivance . . . is as inconsistent with the rudimentary de-
mands ofjustice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation.
Id.
37 Fuentes I, 907 N.E.2d at 289.
38Id.
3 Cf People v. Irizarry, No. 6676-2006, 2009 WL 1758769, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 15,
2009) (finding that the ballistics' evidence found upon Irizarry did not exculpate Trujillo and
Castillo since the prosecution's theory was that they were acting in concert).
40 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
110 (1976) ("If the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the
character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor.").
41 People v. Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d 915, 918 (N.Y. 1990) (quoting United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
928 [Vol. 26
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culpatory or impeachment evidence.4 2 Most Brady violations are
never discovered; therefore, there are no remedial measures.43 Thus,
the criminal justice system is harmed as a whole because the lack of a
fair trial inhibits the ability to discern the innocent from the guilty.44
Brady violations are serious in nature because if certain material is
not produced, it represents to the defense that the evidence does not
exist, and, as a result, the defense might change its tactics, strategies,
and decisions based upon the non existence of a piece of evidence.45
In Brady v. Maryland, John Brady and Donald Boblit were
both convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to the death pe-
nalty.46 Brady's argument was that although he participated in the
crime, he did not do the actual killing and should not receive the
death penalty.47 Prior to trial, Brady's counsel requested all extra-
judicial statements made by Boblit.48 Brady appealed his conviction,
but the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.49 It was
not until after the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed Brady's con-
viction that Brady discovered a statement given by Boblit on July 9,
1958, where Boblit admitted to doing the actual killing.so This state-
ment was never disclosed to Brady or his counsel.5 ' As a result, Bra-
dy's counsel petitioned the trial court for post-conviction relief.52
The trial court dismissed the petition; however, Brady's counsel ap-
pealed, and the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the "suppression
of the evidence by the prosecution denied [Brady] due process of
law.", 3 Consequently, the Maryland Court of Appeals remanded to
case for retrial on the issue of sentencing alone.54 Brady appealed to
the United States Supreme Court arguing that the remand should be




45 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
46 Brady, 373 U.S. at 84.
47 id.
48 id.
49 Id. at 84-85.
50 Id at 84.
5 Brady, 373 U.S. at 84.
52 Id. at 84-85.
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regarding the conviction as well as the sentencing.
The Court explained in Brady that when "[the] prosecution
... withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made
available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty ... that
does not comport with standards of justice."56 However, the fact that
the confession would not have reduced the offense to anything below
first degree murder illustrates the lack of prejudice suffered by Brady
when the confession was withheld in a trial of his guilt.57 The con-
fession clearly implicated Brady, even though it illustrates that Boblit
did the killing.58 The Supreme Court noted the severity of such sup-
pression by stating that such "suppression by the prosecution of evi-
dence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irres-
pective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."5 9  The
Court held that it was proper for Brady to receive a new hearing re-
garding sentencing and not on the issue of guilt because the failure to
disclose the confession only prejudiced the sentencing hearing.60
Nearly forty years later, the Supreme Court revisited Brady in
Strickler v. Greene.61 In Strickler, the defendant, Tommy Strickler
was found guilty of abduction, robbery, and capital murder.62 On
January 5, 1990, Leanne Whitlock was abducted from a local shop-
ping center and murdered.63 Anne Stoltzfus was a main witness and
provided extensive testimony, based on her observations on January
5, 1990.64 On the day of the crime, Stoltzfus claims to have seen
Strickler, Henderson, and a blond Caucasian woman in the local
shopping mall in addition to seeing the abduction in the parking lot of
the shopping mall.65  After a conflict in the parking lot between
Strickler, Henderson, and Whitlock, Stoltzfus claims to have had her
* See id.
56 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88.
* Id. at 88.
* See id. at 84, 88.
* Id. at 87.
60 Id. at 88.
61 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
62 Id. at 277. Mr. Ronald Henderson, a co-defendant, was also convicted of murder, but
he did not receive the death penalty. Id. at 266.
63 Id.
6 Id.
65 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 270.
[Vol. 26930
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daughter write down the license plate number of the car.66 Through-
out the trial, Stoltzfus asserts that she has an "exceptionally good
memory."67
After being convicted of capital murder, Strickler filed a writ
of habeas corpus to vacate the capital murder conviction arguing that
he did not receive a fair trial since the prosecution withheld Brady
material.68 Strickler argues that letters Stoltzfus wrote to Detective
Claytor along with Claytor's notes of his interviews with Stoltzfus
should have been disclosed because they are Brady material.69
Strickler contends that the use of these documents would have al-
lowed Strickler to impeach significant parts of Stoltzfus' testimony,
and the inability to do so has prejudiced the jury's finding of Strick-
ler's guilt.70 The United States District Court explained that Strickler
"had no independent access to this material and the Commonwealth
repeatedly withheld it throughout [Strickler's] state habeas proceed-
ings."n Since the failure to disclose these documents was "suffi-
ciently prejudicial to undermine the confidence in the jury's verdict,"
the district court found a Brady violation and vacated the capital
murder conviction.72 However, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit reversed because Strickler never argued a Bra-
dy violation at his trial or at a state collateral proceeding.73 The court
of appeals considered this argument to be available to Strickler dur-
ing the state proceedings because he "should have known of such
claims through the exercise of reasonable diligence."74 Additionally,
the court of appeals found Strickler's allegation of a Brady violation
to be without any merit since the requirement of prejudice could not
be satisfied; Strickler appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The subject of Strickler's claim for a Brady violation are eight
66 Id. at 272.
67 Id. at 273.
68 Id. at 265.
69 See id at 266, 273.
70 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 266.
71 Id. at 278.
72 Id. at 279.
7 Id.
74 id.
7 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280.
2010] 931
7
Cullington: Court of Appeals of New York - People v. Fuentes
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2010
TOUROLAWREVIEW
exhibits, which were undisclosed.7 6 Exhibit one is a note by Detec-
tive Claytor, dated January 19, 1990, and explains that Stoltzfus
could only identify the Caucasian female. 77 Exhibit two is a sum-
mary by Detective Claytor of his interview with Stoltzfus on January
19, 1990 and January 20, 1990.78 During this interview, Stoltzfus ex-
plains that she is unsure if she could identify the Caucasian males that
she saw on January 5, 1990 at the shopping mall. 79 Exhibit three is a
summary of the abduction.80 Exhibit four is a letter from Stoltzfus to
Detective Claytor where Stoltzfus claims to have clarified some of
her confusions by conversing with her daughter, but that she is still
having problems remembering.8' Exhibit five is a letter from
Stoltzfus to Detective Claytor where she describes the Whitlock's
car, but does not give the license plate number that her daughter alle-
gedly wrote on a piece of paper.82  Exhibit six is a letter from
Stoltzfus to Detective Claytor, dated January 25, 1990, where she ex-
plains that after spending time with Whitlock's boyfriend, she is able
to clearly identify Whitlock as the victim.83 Exhibit seven is a letter
from Stoltzfus to Detective Claytor, dated January 16, 1990, where
she thanks him for being patient in handling her "muddled memories"
and that she "never would have made any of the associations that
[Detective Claytor] helped [her] make." 84 Finally, exhibit eight was
undated, but it summarized the events that Stoltzfus testified to and
explained that she did not think anything of throwing out the card,
which contained the license plate number of the car that Strickler,
Henderson, and Whitlock got into.85
These exhibits are significant as they demonstrate the pro-
gression Stolzfus made from the time of investigation until she testi-
fied against Strickler at trial. Looking at these exhibits together illu-
strates that Stolzfus started off extremely uncertain about the identity









8s Strickler, 527 U.S. at 275.
932 [Vol. 26
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of the Caucasian female and the alleged perpetrators. However, as
time progresses, it is evident that Stolzfus remembered additional in-
formation at the suggestion of her daughter, Whitlock's boyfriend,
and Detective Claytor. This information would have been beneficial
to the defense in attacking the credibility of Stolzfus on cross-
examination as it seems she was unduly influenced
The Supreme Court explained that the duty to disclose evi-
dence to the criminal defendant pertains to exculpatory and im-
peachment evidence. 86 This duty applies even though the criminal
defendant has made no request for the evidence. As a result, "the
individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence
known to the others acting on the government's behalf."88 This in-
cludes evidence known only by the police and/or investigators. 89 The
prosecution represents the government and is under a duty to seek
justice not convictions.90
In this case, the Supreme Court found that the undisclosed
material could have been used to impeach Stoltzfus because there is
an extreme conflict "between (a) the terrifying incident that Stoltzfus
confidently described in her testimony and (b) her initial perception
of the event 'as a trial episode of college kids carrying on' that her
daughter did not even notice." 91 Thus, the first element of a Brady
violation, which requires favorable exculpatory or impeaching evi-
dence, was satisfied.92 The second element of suppression by the
prosecution is satisfied as well, since the prosecution knew of a few
of the documents, and should have used due diligence to discover the
remaining documents from the detective on the case and disclose
them to the defendant. 93 By using open file discovery and not seek-
ing out these files, the prosecution represented to Strickler that this
type of evidence did not exist.94 For documents as significant as
these, this is likely to have altered Strickler's approach, strategies,
86 Id. at 280.
87 Id.
8 Id. at 28 1.
89 Id at 280-81.
90 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281.
' Id. at 282.
92 id.
93Id.
94 Id at 285.
2010] 933
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and tactics at trial.
Regarding the third element of prejudice, the Supreme Court
held that the court of appeals was incorrect in finding that without the
undisclosed evidence, the remaining evidence was sufficient to war-
rant a conviction by the jury.95 In deciding the prejudice component
of a Brady violation, the Court asks whether Strickler received a fair
trial that resulted in a "verdict worthy of confidence" without the evi-
dence. 96 In order to do so, a court may not look to the disclosed evi-
dence in a vacuum, but must determine whether the undisclosed evi-
dence would put the case in a different light.97 If this new light
would undermine confidence in the verdict, then there must be a re-
versal so that this undisclosed evidence may be considered to ensure
a fair trial. 98 Thus, the Court found that the non-disclosure of these
documents was not prejudicial because there was only a "reasonable
possibility" and not a "reasonable probability" that this evidence
would have affected the outcome of the trial.99 The fact that Strickler
was the one seen driving the car, he kept the car, and he threatened
Henderson with a knife the same evening would allow the jury to
conclude that he was leader of the crime.100 Alternatively, Strickler
could still be guilty of capital murder even without proof that he was
the dominant partner.' 0 Finally, the forensic evidence linking Strick-
ler to the crime and the need for two people to hold down Whitlock
and lift the rock demonstrates that there was a joint partnership in
murdering Whitlock.102 Since the third element for a Brady violation
could not be satisfied, the Supreme Court held that Strickler's convic-
tion and sentencing remained valid. 03
The New York State Constitution also guarantees "a criminal
defendant the right to discover favorable evidence in the People's
95 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290.
96 Id at 289-90.
9 Id at 290 ([T]he question is whether 'the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken
to put the whole case in such a different light as to undernine confidence in the verdict.'
98 Id.
9 Id. at 291.
1* Strickler, 527 U.S. at 292.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 293.
103 Id. at 296.
[Vol. 26934
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possession material to guilt or punishment."1 04 This guarantee gives
criminal defendants the right to discover exculpatory evidence under
the Due Process Clause of the New York State Constitution. 05  In
New York, the requirement for a Brady violation is substantially sim-
ilar to the federal court's requirements, except for the third element
regarding materiality. The New York Court of Appeals treats Brady
violations differently than in the federal context.106 The federal sys-
tem uses the "reasonable probability" standard in analyzing the mate-
riality of Brady material that has been suppressed. 0 7 In United States
v. Agurs, the Supreme Court of the United States announced a two-
tiered materiality standard when analyzing Brady violations.'08 The
first tier dealt with evidence that the defendant specifically re-
quested.109 If suppressed, this evidence is material resulting in a de-
privation of due process of law if it "might have affected the outcome
of the trial.""10 For the second tier, general requests or no requests,
the prosecution's duty to disclose is based upon the nature of the evi-
dence, and the evidence must be disclosed if it would create "a rea-
sonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.""' However, in United
States v. Bagley, the Supreme Court leaves the two-tiered materiality
standard set forth in United States v. Agurs and adopts the "reasona-
ble probability" standard for Brady violations.1 2 In People v. Vilar-
'0 Fuentes 1, 907 N.E.2d at 289.
105 See id; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6, states, in pertinent part: "[n]o person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
106 Michele Kligman, New York State Constitutional Decisions: 2006 Compilation Due
Process Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division, Third Department, People v. Ri-
vette, 22 ToURo L. REV. 61, 65 (2006) (discussing New York's refusal to adopt the "reason-
able probability" standard for analyzing Brady violations).
10 Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d at 920.
108 Kligman, supra note 106, at 64.
09 Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d at 917-18.
110 Id. (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104).
" Id. at 918 (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112).
112 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 681-82 (1985).
[T]he Strickland ... test for materiality [is] sufficiently flexible to cover
the 'no request,' 'general request,' and 'specific request' cases of prose-
cutorial failure to disclose [Brady material]: The evidence is material
only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been dis-
closed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been dif-
ferent. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine
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di, the New York Court of Appeals refused to adopt the "reasonably
probability" standard.'"3 The court altered the two tiered standard set
out in United States v. Agurs and held that undisclosed "evidence is
material if there is a 'reasonable possibility' that the failure to dis-
close the exculpatory [evidence] contributed to the verdict."ll 4
In People v. Hunter,"'5 Burton Hunter was convicted of first
degree sodomy.1 6 As in most criminal trials, Hunter had two differ-
ent versions of the events. According to the victim, on December 9,
2001, she met Hunter and went to his home to watch a movie."'
When she was at his home, the victim claims that he performed sex-
ual intercourse and oral sex on her without her consent."' 8 Hunter
claims that only oral sex took place and that when the victim said no
he stopped.' '9 After he stopped, Hunter claims that she put on her
cloths and ran out of the house.120 He followed her to see what was
wrong, and she told him that he raped her.121 It is undisputed that
immediately thereafter the victim told her friend and her mother that
Hunter had raped her.122
After Hunter's trial, he discovered that another man, Parker,
had been indicted for raping the victim as well.123 The alleged rape
of the victim by Parker took place ten months after the alleged rape
of the victim by Hunter, and one month before Hunter's trial.124 On
May 27, 2003, Parker plead guilty to raping the victim.125
As a result of this discovery, Hunter moved pursuant to CPL
section 440.10 to set aside his conviction, arguing that the prosecu-
tion's failure to disclose that the victim claimed another man had
raped her was a Brady violation.12 6 The prosecutor conceded that he
" Kligman, supra note 106 at 65.
114 People v. Bumette, 612 N.Y.S.2d 774, 778 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1994).
115 People v. Hunter, 892 N.E.2d 365 (N.Y. 2008).
116 Id. at 367.
" Id at 366.
118 Id
119 Id.
120 Hunter, 892 N.E.2d at 366.
121 id.
122 id.
123 Id. at 367.
124 id
121 Hunter, 892 N.E.2d at 367.
126 id
12
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learned of the accusation prior to Hunter's trial. 127 The county court
set aside Hunter's conviction holding that there was a Brady viola-
tion; however, the appellate division reversed. 128 The appellate divi-
sion held that the evidence of Parker's alleged rape of the victim
would not be admissible at trial because Hunter did not show that
"the accusation was false or that it was similar enough to the [vic-
tim's] accusation of [Hunter] to suggest 'a pattern of false com-
plaints;' " Hunter appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. 129
The New York Court of Appeals primarily considers the third
element of a Brady violation because it is clear that this evidence is
impeachment evidence and that the prosecution knew, but did not
disclose the evidence to Hunter.130 Unlike the appellate division, the
court determined that the Parker evidence would be admissible be-
cause the trial court has discretion to permit impeachment evidence to
be admitted.'31 In analyzing the prejudice element of a Brady viola-
tion, the court refers to the "reasonable probability" standard set out
in the federal courts; however, in application, the court uses the New
York standard for no requests.132 The New York standard for evi-
dence not requested is that it is material if it would create "a reasona-
ble doubt that did not otherwise exist." 33 The court explains that the
failure to disclose the fact that the victim also accused Parker of rape
is material because Parker's "evidence would have added a little
more doubt to the jury's view of the [victim's] allegations. 134 "We
find it reasonably probable that a little more doubt would have been
enough." 135 Thus, the prosecution did commit a Brady violation, and
Hunter is entitled to a new and fair trial.
This opinion seems to combine the "reasonable probability"
standard set out in Bagley with the original New York standard of
creating "a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist." The court




130 Hunter, 892 N.E.2d at 367.
131 Id. at 368.
132 Id. at 368.
133 Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d at 918 (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112).
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able probability" standard instead of the "reasonable possibility"
standard articulated by the New York Court of Appeals in Vilardi.136
In Fuentes, the court seems to utilize its own construction of
the materiality standard in this opinion. According to the court, if the
defendant makes a specific request for the material, then the failure to
disclose is material if "there exists a 'reasonable possibility' that it
would have changed the result of the proceeding." 37 However, if
there is no request or a general request, then the court stated that the
failure to disclose is material if there is a " 'reasonably probability'
that it would have changed the outcome of the proceedings."1 38 The
court seems to be mixing the different standards articulated for ana-
lyzing Brady violations. Additionally, by utilizing the reasonable
probability standard when there has not been a specific request, the
court is making it more difficult for the defendant to prove a Brady
violation. With this opinion, the New York Court of Appeals has
made it more difficult to determine which standard to utilize when
confronted with a Brady violation under the New York State Consti-
tution.
As expected, the New York Court of Appeals found there to
be no Brady violation. The court refuses to articulate which standard
it is using, but finds that the undisclosed record of consultation
"would not have altered the outcome of the case." 39 There is no dis-
cussion if this was determined on a "reasonable probability" basis or
"reasonable possibility" basis.
Nonetheless, the court discounts the undisclosed document by
explaining that it would not have altered the outcome of the case.140
The court mentions the following reasons for the materiality standard
to not be satisfied: the interview notes corroborate the victim's tes-
timony that she walked home alone, it is unclear as to whether the
suicidal thoughts occurred due to the alleged rape or a situation prior
to the alleged rape, there was no evidence of mental illness that af-
fected perception, and the victim's use of marijuana was only twice
136 Kligman, supra note 106 at 67 (discussing New York's refusal to adopt the "reasona-
ble probability" standard for analyzing Brady violations).
" Fuentes I, 907 N.E.2d at 289.
38 Id.
19 Id. at 289.
140 Id. at 289.
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and did not affect perception.141 Finally, the court condones the ac-
tions of the prosecution by explaining that the prosecution should
have requested an in camera inspection of the documents to deter-
mine if they were privileged or Brady material. 142
Pamela Cullington
141 Id. at 289-90.
142 Fuentes I, 907 N.E.2d at 290 (explaining that defense counsel should be able to rely on
the file obtained pursuant to open file discovery and be able to assume that it is complete).
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